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Fortifying American Emergency
Power: A Multinational
Comparison to Contain Crises
ABSTRACT

Countries will inevitably face emergencies. Historically,
governments have exercised immense power in response to
emergencies. For responses to be quick and effective, emergency
power operates outside of the normal rule of law. While disbanding
the normal rule of law may be necessary from time to time to protect
national security, the unilateralability of government to take such
action creates perverse incentives to abuse the power. Abuses of
emergency power are found across the globe, most notably occurring
in the United States recently.
In the wake of the Trump Administration, this Note seeks to
identify how and why the US emergency power system failed both

to protect against abuse and to assist in effective decision-making.
While the Trump Administration has magnified problems with

emergency power in the United States, the perverse incentives are
certainly not unique to this administrationor country.
This Note takes a multinational approach to the emergency
power problem, identifying the most-and least-effective
safeguards adopted by countries around the world. This Note then
offers a solution that balances national security and individual
rights. Designedfor the United States, this solution provides a way
for president-elect Joe Biden to yield power back to the country, a
legacy that should long outlast his presidency and one that should
garner bipartisansupport. While US-centric, these protections are
not US-specific. Other countries facing emergency power problems
should also take note of the multinationalcomparison to implement
a system that acknowledges the need for swift action during
emergencies while also protecting against abuses of individual
rights.
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INTRODUCTION

Exercises of emergency power are sometimes necessary to protect
national security. By temporarily suspending the normal rule of law,
emergency power allows governments to rapidly respond to crises.

However, the use of emergency power often comes at the expense of
individual rights and liberties, especially when used outside the realm
of imminent danger.1 If wielded frequently or improperly, emergency
power will erode the rule of law. It creates perverse incentives,

allowing government officials to usurp the political process and

1.

See ERNST-WOLFGANG BOCKENFORDE, The Repressed State of Emergency: The

Exercise of State Authority in ExtraordinaryCircumstances[1978], in CONsTITUTIONAL

AND POLITICAL THEORY 108, 115-121 (Mirjam Kunkler & Tine Stein eds., Thomas
Dunlap trans., Oxford University Press 2017) (explaining the commonly accepted
principles of emergency power).
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unilaterally expand their own power at the cost of individual freedom. 2
Emergency power provides a quasi-legal scheme for the degradation of

individual rights.
On the flip side, a failure to effectively utilize emergency power in
times of crisis jeopardizes national security and human lives. When

emergency power regimes lack coherence, officials may be unable, or
perhaps unwilling, to use them in dire situations. The great potential
of emergency powers to protect a country from an imminent, dangerous
situation is eroded when government officials fail to use them

effectively. The risks associated with emergency power are immense.
This problem is especially pronounced in the United States.
Former President Donald Trump, in various instances, was criticized
for both unjustified and ineffective uses of emergency power. He used
emergency powers to build a border wall despite substantial political
opposition, even within his own political party. 3 His administration's
response to the national emergency caused by the Covid-19 pandemic
was ineffective; the response lacked coherence and was fundamentally

unable to stop the spread. 4 In both of these scenarios, President
Trump's actions revealed the troubles of the US emergency power
regime.
While the Trump administration revealed the problems with
emergency power in the United States, the problems are not unique to
the United States. This Note evaluates the form and function of
emergency power systems across the globe to identify the most effective
safeguards, ultimately recommending a system that protects the rule
of law while also providing for effective governance in unprecedented
circumstances.
This Note proceeds as follows. Part II describes the global
concerns associated with emergency powers, tracing governmental
responses to emergencies in various countries. These responses
illustrate the challenges of emergency power structures and set the
context for why reform is vital. Part III provides the framework for
analyzing exercises of emergency power, describing the tension
between respecting individual rights and protecting national security.
Part IV discusses emergency power structures across the globe-the

2.

See CLEMENT FATOVIc, OUTSIDE THE LAW 7-10 (Sanford Levinson & Jeffrey

K. Tulis, eds., 2009) (discussing the relationship between executive and congressional
power during emergencies, acknowledging that constitutional ambiguity exists).
3.

Meagan

Vazquez

& Priscilla

Alvarez,

White House Extends National

Emergency
on
the
Southern
Border,
CNN
(Feb.
14,
2020),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/02/13/politics/southern-border-national-emergency-continua
tion/index.html [https://perma.cc/6LJD-JAMX] (archived Sept. 28, 2020).
4.
Lori Aratani, Oversight Report Calls Trump Administration Response to the
Pandemic a "Failure," WASH. POST (Oct. 30, 2020), https://www.washington
post.com/localltrafficandcommuting/trump-coronavirus-response-failure/2020/10/29/cb5

8e066-la15-1leb-82db-60b15c874105_story.html
ived December 29, 2020).

[https://perma.cc/XC4K-9UFT]

(arch-
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safeguards, risks, and benefits. Part V proposes a solution to
emergency power problems: specific legislation and a multi-member

body that prepares for and advises on national emergencies. Taking
inspiration from the German model, this Note proposes a highly

codified system for emergency power that protects the rule of law in
the age of modern emergencies. Part VI briefly concludes.

II. THE PROBLEM
On February 15, 2019, President Donald Trump declared a
national emergency concerning the southern border of the United
States. 5 President Trump alleged that unlawful migration of criminals

and gang members at the southern border presented a crisis that
threatened "core national security interests and constitute[d] a
national emergency." 6 The president acknowledged the "long-

standing" problem of "large-scale unlawful migration" but claimed that
the situation had worsened in recent years. 7 The president's
declaration was pursuant to the National Emergency Act (NEA), which

grants access to a variety of laws that are normally dormant. 8
Pursuant to these laws, the president diverted funds from other
departments and federal programs to construct a border wall between
the United States and Mexico. 9
The emergency declaration and subsequent diversion of funds

were extremely controversial. On the campaign trail, President Trump
promised to construct a border wall between the United States and
Mexico at Mexico's expense. 10 He tweeted disparagingly about
Mexican immigrants: "They're bringing drugs. They're bringing crime.
They're rapists." 1 1 Meanwhile, Mexico continually refused to pay for
the wall. 12 Once President Trump took office, he attempted to secure
13
congressional funding for the wall. But when Congress failed to pass

See generally Proclamation No. 9844, 84 Fed. Reg. 4949 (Feb. 20, 2019).
Id. at 4949.
Id.
National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651 (2018); L. ELAINE
HALCHIN, CONG. RscH. SERV., REP. # 98-505, NATIONAL EMERGENCY POWERS (2020).
Proclamation No. 9844, 84 Fed. Reg. at 4949-50.
9.
See Michael C. Bender, How the Border Wall, Trump's Signature Campaign
10.
Promise, Turned into a National Emergency, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 15, 2019),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-promised-to-build-that-wall-then-ran-out-of-timeand-options-11550262854 [https://perma.cc/K6W7-BEUG] (archived Sept. 28, 2020)
(describing President Trump's statements).
Katie Reilly, Here Are All the Times Donald Trump Insulted Mexico, TIME
11.
https://time.com/4473972/donald-trump-mexico-meeting-insult/
2016),
31,
(Aug.
[https://perma.cc/7UBC-RWEC] (archived Sept. 28, 2020).
See Bender, supra note 10 (explaining the timeline of the emergency
12.
declaration and noting the challenges with funding).
13.
Id.
5.
6.
7.
8.
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legislation to build the wall, despite Republican control of both houses
for two years, President Trump threatened to declare a national
emergency to start construction-a threat that he followed through

on. 14
Given this context, many Americans felt that President Trump

declared a national emergency to usurp the political process and
legislate his animosity against Mexico, as well as against Hispanic and
Latino Americans. 1 5 In addition to experiencing political and
emotional dissatisfaction with the president's decision, many
Americans were stunned that the president possessed the unilateral
power to legislate his own policy preferences so easily.1 6 Congress
promptly passed a resolution to terminate the emergency declaration,
but President Trump vetoed the resolution. 17 Congress lacked the twothirds support necessary to overturn the veto, so the state of emergency
remained, 18 and President Trump continued to possess broad
emergency powers. 1 9 Because President Trump acted under
congressional authorization through the NEA, litigation was futile
from the start.20

14.
See David Hopkins, Why Trump Didn't Build the Wall When Republicans
Controlled
Congress,
WASH.
POST
(Jan.
25,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/01/25/why-trump-didnt-build-wall-whe
n-republicans-controlled-congress/ [https://perma.cc/GGW3-9V7W] (archived Dec. 29,
2020); see also Bender, supra note 10 (explaining the timeline for the funding dispute).
15.
See Anthony Romero, Trump's 'Emergency' Declaration is Illegal, AM. CIv.
LIBERTIES UNION (Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.aclu.org/blog/civil-liberties/executivebranch/trumps-emergency-declaration-illegal [https://perma.cc/C5FK-8RV2] (archived
Sept. 28, 2020) (describing the lack of legal basis for the emergency declaration and the
corresponding hostility that the president is promoting).
16 . See Michael Tackett, Trump Issues First Veto After Congress Rejects Border
https://www.nytimes.coml
15,
2019),
(Mar.
TIMES
N.Y.
Emergency,
[https://perma.cc/L4332019/03/15/us/politics/trump-veto-national-emergency.html
JSAW] (archived Sept. 7, 2020) (detailing the public concern surrounding the emergency
declaration).

H.J.Res. 46: Relating to a National Emergency Declared by the President on
17.
February 15,
2019, American Immigration Lawyers
Association
[AILA],
https://www.aila.org/advo-media/whats-happening-in-congress/pending-legislation/hjre

(last visited Nov. 4, 2019) [https://
s-46-national-emergency-february-15-2019
perma.cc/K3WL-FG5J] (archived Sept. 7, 2020) [hereinafter AILA].
18. Id.
19.
See Tackett, supra note 16 (detailing the consequences of Congress' failure to
pass the resolution barring the declaration).
20.

Vazquez & Alvarez, supra note 3; see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.

Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585, 636-37 (1952) (holding that the president's power is weakest
when acting in opposition to Congress). Some litigants argue that the NEA is a violation
of the non-delegation doctrine, although that doctrine is largely non-existent today. See
generally Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (the only modern non-delegation case,
holding that some guiding standards are required for congressional delegations). There
is a possibility that the current Supreme Court may reconsider the nondelegation
doctrine. For example, see Gundy v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2116, 2148 (2019) (Gorsuch,
J., dissenting) (suggesting that the intelligible principle doctrine is insufficient).

1692
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Thousands of miles away in France, emergency declarations also
have a history of controversy. In 1961, the French president declared
an emergency during the Algerian war. 2 1 The escalated crisis arguably
existed for only four days but the president exercised emergency
powers for five months. 22 The emergency powers increased police
power and circumvented normal rules. 2 3 In 2015, the French president

declared a national emergency related to a terrorist attack; the
government then conducted intrusive searches and imposed restrictive
house arrest requirements on Muslim individuals in a discriminatory

way. 2 4 Beyond allegations of discrimination, critics also maintain that
the actions taken pursuant to the emergency declaration were too
expansive, eroding the rule of law. 2 5 Law enforcement conducted 3,200

searches authorized through the emergency declaration, which many
26
argue was a disproportionate response to the stated emergency.

The national emergency declarations at the US southern border
and in France are examples of leaders harnessing emergency powers
beyond what is necessary to respond to an emergency situation. The
border wall is an extended project that will require continued funding

and support-placing America within a state of emergency for an
extended period of time. 2 7 The crisis in France was handled in a

discriminatory and overly-expansive way. 2 8 These exercises of power
are contrary to the notion that emergency power should be exercised
in discrete moments with the normal state of affairs resuming as soon
as possible. 2 9 These emergency declarations demonstrate the broad
danger with large delegations of emergency power-that leaders may
unilaterally usurp the legislative process to enhance their own power.
A little over one

year

after President Trump's

emergency

declaration at the Southern Border, he declared an emergency once

21.

CINDY SKACH, BORROWING CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGNS 103-04 (2005).

Id. at 103.
Id. at 103-05.
France:Abuses Under State of Emergency, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Feb. 13,
2016,
7:01 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/02/03/france-abuses-under-stateemergency [https://perma.cc/Z5PP-UXF2] (archived Sept. 28, 2020).
25.
See id. ("The police have used their new emergency powers in abusive,
discriminatory, and unjustified ways.").
26.
Id.
27.
See Construction Dive Editors, Building the Wall: A Construction Timeline,
CONSTRUCTION DIVE (April 4, 2019), https://www.constructiondive.com/news/buildingthe-wall-a-construction-timeline/551050/ [https://perma.cc/Z92L-UN4Y] (archived Sept.
7, 2020) (detailing the anticipated length of the border wall construction). The strategy
of using emergency declarations to expand executive power indefinitely is not unique to
President Trump. In response to terrorism and the possibility of an emergency, then Vice
President Dick Cheney said that the struggle "may never end." FATOVIC, supra note 2,
at 261.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 24.
28.
See BOCKENFORDE, supra note 1, at 116-17 (explaining the basic restraints
29.
on emergency power).
22.
23.
24.

20201
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more-this time in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. 30 While China
had been battling Covid-19 for months, the Trump Administration

downplayed the risk of global spread. 31 Before long, countries across
the globe began taking measures to contain the virus. 32 Some countries
legally mandated lockdowns, others-including the United Statessimply encouraged their citizens to stay home. 3 3 President Trump did
not coordinate a national response to the pandemic, and the US
response to Covid-19 can now be characterized as an utter failure, with
thousands of deaths a week. 34 For a country with such vast emergency
power and a president unafraid to use such power in politically
convenient moments, the United States failed to effectively manage the
virus, support healthcare needs, and protect the citizenry.
Every day, the news reports another way in which the Trump
Administration failed its people. 3 5 For example, health officials can
muster no reasoning for why the Trump Administration refused to

purchase a sufficient stock of vaccines from one manufacturer, even
when given multiple opportunities to do so. 36 As President Trump

approaches his final days in office and continues his failed Operation
Warp Speed, other countries have bought up the vaccines and states
struggle to implement an effective vaccination rollout. 3 7 The US
emergency power system is not only ripe for abuse-seen through the

Southern Border-this Note argues that it is also ineffectual-seen
through the failed response to the Covid-19 pandemic.
A sharp contrast exists across the globe. In New Zealand, Prime
Minister Jacinda Ardern imposed significant emergency restrictions in

30.
31.

See generally Proclamation No. 9994, 85 Fed Reg. 15337 (Mar. 13, 2020).
Juana Summers, Timeline: How Trump Has Downplayed the Coronavirus

Pandemic, NPR (Oct. 2, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/latest-updates-trump-covid-

19-results/2020/10/02/919432383/how-trump-has-downplayed-the-coronavirus-pandemi
c [https://perma.cc/CPE9-ASCJ] (archived Dec. 29, 2020).
32.
Listings of WHO's Response to COVID-19, WORLD HEATH ORG. (June 29,
2020), https://www.who.int/news/item/29-06-2020-covidtimeline [https://perma.cc/6LDS6RUN] (archived Dec. 29, 2020) [hereinafter WHO].
See id. (describing the global response to Covid-19); Summers, supra note 31
33.
(contrasting the US response with the global response).
34.
The U.S. Passes 4 Million Cases in November Alone, Doubling October's Tally,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/live/2020/11/28/world/covid-19coronavirus [https://perma.cc/94C9-JFS3] (archived Dec. 29, 2020) [hereinafter TIMES].
See id. (tracking the timeline of cases and deaths in the United States).
35.
Sharon LaFraniere, Katie Thomas & Noah Weiland, Trump Administration
36.
Passed on Chance to Secure More of Pfizer Vaccine, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/07/us/politics/trump-pfizer-coronavirus-vaccine.html

[https://perma.cc/J7KE-LLA9] (archived Dec. 29, 2020).
See id. (describing the Trump Administration's failure to purchase needed
37.
vaccines); see also Tucker Higgins, Fundingfor Vaccine Distributionat Stake in the Push
for
a
New
Covid
Relief
Bill,
CNBC
(Dec.
14,
2020),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/14/coronavirus-vaccine-distribution-money-at-stake-in-c
(archived Dec. 29, 2020)
ovid-relief-talks.html [https://perma.cc/WPH6-KCYB]
(explaining states' struggles with funding for vaccination rollout).

1694

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

response to Covid-19. 38 By utilizing large

[VOL. 3.:1687

grants of statutory

emergency power-like President Trump at the US southern border-

Ardern required nearly everyone to stay at home and imposed
penalties

for

noncompliance. 39

The

Civil

Defence

Emergency

Management Act 2002 granted Ardern powers of requisition, the power
to close roads, and the power to direct people to stop doing activities
40
While Ardern's use of
substantially contributing to the emergency.

the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act may have felt extreme
at the time, perhaps pushing the boundary of acceptable emergency
power, New Zealand is thriving today as the majority of the rest of the
41
world struggles to contain the pandemic.

New Zealand's pandemic response demonstrates that exercises of
emergency power are difficult to evaluate ex ante. Other countries,

such as the United States, should not respond to abuses of emergency
power by shutting down all avenues for swift and effective responses.

Ardern's exercise of immense power-in response to an imminent crisis
and with her country's support-has allowed the country to return,

generally, to the normal state of affairs and rule of law. But those same
powers may not have been effective in other countries and perhaps
even subject to abuse.
Nevertheless, the problems and risks associated with emergency
power affect countries across the globe. While particularly relevant in
the United States today, the concerns are not unique to President
Trump or to the US system. 4 2 This Note proceeds by discussing the
tensions posed by emergency power and then analyzing emergency

power regimes across the globe.

Michael G. Baker, Nick Wilson & Andrew Anglemyer, Successful Elimination
38.
of Covid-19 Transmission in New Zealand, 383 NEW ENGL. J. MED. E56(1), e56(1)-(3)
(2020).
See Kelly Buchanan, New Zealand: New COVID-19 Public Health Response
39.
Legislation
Enacted,
LIBRARY
OF
CONGRESS
(May
28,
2020),
https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/new-zealand-new-covid-19-public-health-r
esponse-legislation-enacted/ [https://perma.cc/YPB2-T2TK] (archived Dec. 29, 2020)
(describing New Zealand's response to Covid-19).
40.
Id.
41.
See Baker, Wilson & Anglemyer, supra note 38 (describing New Zealand's
effective elimination in response).
See Jordan Fischer, Presidents Have Declared Emergencies 60 Times Since
42.
1976-but
Trump's
Is
Unprecedented,
WUSA
(Feb.
14,
2019),
https://www.wusa9.com/article/news/local/dc/presidents-have-declared-emergencies-60-

times-since-1976-but-trumps-is-unprecedented/65-6d957d8f-c534-43dd-9d31-af2844a2c
6e1 [https://perma.cc/Z5QY-UBNQ] (archived Sept. 7, 2020) (detailing historic exercises
of emergency power in the United States, with President Clinton declaring eighteen
emergencies during his presidency).
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TENSIONS POSED BY EMERGENCY POWER

Emergency power can be an effective mechanism for containing

crises by facilitating swift alterations of the normal state of affairs. It
can be used to quickly stop a crisis before it escalates, largely
benefitting society. But it comes at a cost-emergency power entrusts
individuals to rewrite basic laws, a job traditionally reserved for
legislatures and requiring great consensus. 4 3 Trustworthy individuals,
especially when possessing a deep understanding of and care for their
country and the crisis, can utilize emergency power to shorten the
extent and degree of a crisis. 44 Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern did just
this in response to Covid-19. The New Zealand government, under
Ardern's command, was able to utilize existing law to rapidly control

the spread of the pandemic. New Zealand controlled the virus in a
matter of months. 4 5
However, trustworthy individuals with a deep understanding and
commitment to their country, or even effective government actors for
that matter, are not guaranteed. The emergency power structures that
allow for swift, unilateral action are ripe for abuse. In the United

States, President Donald Trump declared a national emergency at the
southern border, unrelated to an imminent crisis, as a tool to
implement a policy promise-a border wall. 4 6 And when a true crisis
arose-Covid-19-President Trump failed to effectively utilize existing
law to contain it. 4 7
These two responses, contrasted to one another, caution against
hasty judgment when redesigning an emergency power system. The
existence of an effective response in New Zealand, under the leadership
of a trustworthy prime minister, ought not suggest that all countries

adopt that system. The problems in the United States, under the
leadership of a deceitful president, ought not suggest that emergency
power be eliminated entirely.
Instead, the divergent responses should inform the analysis of
emergency power systems. Emergency power can protect a nation, but
it can also be abused and misused-either to expand power at the cost
of individual rights or by failing to appropriately respond to novel
emergencies. This Part discusses the goals of emergency power

43.
For example, in the United States, the constitution protects basic rights, such
as the right to travel. Laws restricting such rights face strict scrutiny at the Supreme
Court. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (holding that Tennessee may not
impose a durational residency requirement on voting as such a requirement does not

further a compelling state interest justifying its intrusion on the right to travel).
See FATOVIc, supra note 2, at 5-6 (discussing the value of virtue in leaders).
44.
45.
See Baker, Wilson & Anglemyer, supra note 38.
46.
See Bender, supra note 10 (describing how President Trump's policy promise
of a border wall was funded through a national emergency declaration).
47.
See TIMES, supra note 34 (documenting the ways in which the Trump
Administration has failed to respond to Covid-19).
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systems and analyzes how best to prevent abuses of power and ensure
effective responses to emergencies.
A.

PreventingAbuses of Power

In times of emergency, liberal democracies face a tension between
48
To
respecting individual rights and protecting national security.
respect individual rights, liberal democracies promulgate rules in

49
These
advance and seek to prevent consolidation of power.
safeguards slow down decision-making and demand consensus across

government. But emergencies require swift lawmaking, which entails
50
These
suspending the normal legal regime from time to time.
situations pose a dilemma for liberal democracies in a variety of ways.

First, liberal democracies protect individual liberties by requiring
the government to act within the law in a generally predictable

manner. 5 1 Supporters of liberal democracy oppose discretionary
lawmaking because it erodes individual rights, which are central to
liberal
lawmaking,
predictable
encourage
To
democracy. 5 2

democracies promulgate impersonal rules in advance. This system
limits government officials' ability to increase their own power at the
direct cost to individual rights by reducing ad hoc, discretionary, and
53
arbitrary rulemaking.
Yet, rigid adherence to impersonal laws can render a society
54
Without such
unable to protect itself in unforeseen circumstances.

protection, the value of rights may be eroded. Governments may need
to wield discretionary powers from time to time to adequately respond
to crises. In those instances, temporary restraints on individual rights

can be necessary for long-term protection. 5 5 Nevertheless, these
instances are ripe for abuse.
For example, the government may restrict movement in response

to an emergency, perhaps a travel ban restricting travel to and from
certain states. If this occurred once for a limited amount of time, the
benefit to national security may outweigh any infringement on

individual rights. Perhaps the states from which travel is banned lack
effective security screening systems and the ban expires promptly after

48.
49.

FATOVIC, supranote 2, at 3-4.
Id.

50.

See DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAw: LEGALITY IN A TIME OF

EMERGENCY 34-40, 60 (Cambridge University Press, 2006) (describing the challenges
emergencies pose to the rule of law).
FATOVIC, supranote 2, at 3-4.
51.
52.
Id.
See id. (proposing solutions to arbitrary rulemaking).
53.
See DYZENHAUS, supranote 50, at 34-40 (explaining the scholarly debate over
54.
the role of rule of law during exceptional situations).
FATOvIC, supra note 2, at 3; see also DYZENHAUS, supra note 50, at 34-40
55.
(describing why emergency situations may requires suspension of the rule of law).
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security upgrades. However, if restrictions happen frequently or for
extended periods of time-beyond what is necessary to respond to the
emergency-the emergency action may be normalized, with people
simply accepting that travel to and from certain regions is indefinitely
disallowed. In such a situation, the government, as a whole, gains new
power over its people without consent. 5 6
Second, liberal democracies seek to prevent consolidation of
power. 5 7 Whether it be through federalism, multiple branches of
government, a multi-party system, or some combination of those
approaches, liberal democracies exist with separated powers so that
one individual or group does not obtain disproportionate, dangerous
power. The existence of multi-member bodies, such as a congress or
parliament, is a key way power is separated because multi-member
bodies must obtain consensus before acting. 5 8 While consensus alone

is not sufficient to counter large majoritarian influences, requiring
multiple members to agree lessens the relative weights of individual

self-serving views. 59
Unfortunately, slow rulemaking is a consequence of separated

powers. Emergencies require speed, and therefore may necessitate
consolidation of power on occasion. This is generally done by
empowering a governmental actor to take action outside of the normal
realm of law. 60 Rather than obtaining consensus from many groups,

possibly slowing down the process, the governmental actor is
empowered to swiftly declare an emergency and promulgate
regulations that remedy the situation.61
For example, a prime minister may be empowered to declare an
emergency to respond to an imminent crisis without consulting
parliament first. To ensure a swift response, the prime minister gains

substantial rulemaking power. This can be necessary in certain
circumstances. But by knowing this route exists, a self-serving prime
minister could, unfortunately, be incentivized to declare an

unnecessary emergency to pass rules that would otherwise face

56.
See BOCKENFORDE, supra note 1, at 125-27 ("[A]n explicit regulation of the
state of emergency is thus indispensable if the goal is to avoid the undefined
comprehensive authorization of a supralegal state of emergency that would, in the final
analysis, dissolve the constitutional state.").
See Note, Recent Emergency Legislation in West Germany, 82 HARv. L. REV.
57.
1704, 1717, 1719-20 (1969) [hereinafter Recent Emergency Legislation] (detailing the
debate over who ought to possess emergency power).
Id. at 1719-20.
58.
See id. at 1719 (explaining how legislative bodies, when entrusted with
59.
emergency powers or oversight of emergency powers, can serve as a check against abuses

by self-interested politicians).
FAToVIc, supra note 2, at 4-5.
60.
See id.; Recent Emergency Legislation, supra note 57, at 1718-20 (while the
61.
main actor likely must convince some others in his cabinet to support his action, this
cabinet is largely made up of political appointees and other individuals who support his
views). Note that the lead executive official is often most privy to national intelligence.
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opposition by the larger legislative body. This concern is that one
governmental actor will obtain disproportionate power over other
governmental actors.

B. Ensuring Effective Responses to Emergencies
Emergencies generally present unusual, imminent, and grave
threats, typically meaning war or natural disaster. But the modern age
brings new threats, most notably terrorism and pandemics. The
emergency structure designed to respond to war-equipping the
military-or natural disasters-providing for rescue and aid-is weak

when used to combat modern emergencies that tend to be more
unpredictable and long-term. The United States has been involved in
the "war on terror" for over twenty years. 62 The Covid-19 pandemic
spread like wildfire across the globe and will affect international
operations for years to come. 63 While some swift responses are still

necessary to mitigate modern crises, the discretionary rulemaking
provided for by many emergency power structures is ill-equipped to

facilitate reasoned responses to modern emergencies.
Consolidating power in response to emergencies is questionable

outside of the realm of known, typical emergencies. While one
government actor or small cabinet may be the best positioned to swiftly
champion a federal response to something occuring often, like a
tornado, they are less equipped to respond to a something novel, like a
pandemic. 64 In unfamiliar emergencies, swiftness ought not always be
prioritized over reasoned lawmaking. Consolidating power in the
hands of the executive branch can lead to an array of issuesmishandling concerns, spread of misinformation, and a lack of
coordinated response. 6 5 Any of these issues can prolong an emergency

62.

A Timeline of the U.S.-Led War on Terror, HISTORY (May 5, 2020),

https://www.history.com/topics/21st-century/war-on-terror-timeline

[https://perma.cc/

UT9V-T5MV] (archived Dec. 30, 2020).
Helen V. Milner, Susan Peterson, Ryan Powers, Michael J. Tierney & Erik
63.
Voeten, Argument, Trump, COVID-19, and the Future of International Order, FOREIGN

POLICY (Oct. 8, 2020), https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/10/08/international-relations[https://perma.cc/KCV9-KBUN]
experts-polling-pessimism-global-order-trump-covid/
(archived Dec. 30, 2020) (arguing that Covid-19, and President Trump's response to
Covid-19 will lead to "declines in the number of democracies and opportunities for trade
and investment, and dramatic increases in civil wars, human rights abuses, and
collapsing state institutions.").
64.
See Mark Dornauer, Why Was America So Unprepared for the COVID-19
Pandemic?, FOUND. FOR RESEARcH ON EQUAL OPPORTUNITY (Aug. 5, 2020),
https://freopp.org/why-was-america-so-unprepared-for-the-covid- 19-pandemic-8c0602a9
(archived Jan. 21, 2021)
71ec?gi=fbl81dffdd3f [https://perma.ce/6AA6-DFGD]
(explaining why the US struggled to respond to the novel coronavirus).
65.
For example, during the 2020 Covid-19 pandemic, the Trump administration
contributed to the spread of misinformation due to its polarized and disjointed response.
See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Noah Weiland, Study Finds 'Single Largest Driver' of
Coronavirus
Misinformation:
Trump,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct
22,
2020),
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situation. As emergencies change the normal state of affairs, advocacy
and representation from multiple bodies is more important than ever.
When one individual is the main entity entrusted to coordinate a
nationwide response to an ongoing pandemic, accountability and
effective leadership are undermined. While the executive branch
encompasses more than the president, it disproportionately weighs the
view of one individual quite heavily, putting the nation at the will of
one person's preferences with no requirement of larger consensus. 6 6
For example, a president may be empowered to declare an

emergency in response to a terror attack because damage control is the
priority, which demands swift action. For one day or one week, vast

delegations of power to one individual make sense to immediately
contain the crisis. But as the national effort continues and the need to
prevent further attacks remains,

damage control turns into the

implementation of policy preferences by one individual. Beyond
potential

violations

of

individual

rights

discussed

above,

the

implementation of policy preferences through blank-check legislation
cuts against reasoned decision-making. In contrast, requiring
consensus from a multi-member body-perhaps the legislature-for
long-term emergencies would prioritize effective lawmaking over swift
action, hopefully decreasing the length and severity of emergencies in

the long run. 6 7

IV. MULTINATIONAL DISCUSSION

Emergency power is not a new idea-countries have been
exercising emergency power for centuries. Historically, the basis for
emergency power was the doctrine of necessity, which is the notion that

a state is permitted to take actions necessary to preserve itself. In
authoritarian regimes or systems without democratic control, this

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/30/us/politics/trump-coronavirus-misinformation.htm

1 (archived Dec. 30, 2020) [https://perma.cc/LK4S-E2GF] (summarizing a Cornell
University study); Vera Bergengruen & W.J. Hennigan, "You're Gonna Beat It." How
Donald Trump's COVID-19 Battle Has Only Fueled Misinformation, TIME (Oct. 6, 2020),
https://time.com/5896709/trump-covid-campaign/ [https://perma.cc/2BVW-DVLQ] (archived Dec. 30, 2020) (discussing the reasons why President Trump led to the spread of
misinformation).
See Ailsa Chang & John Yoo, Former Deputy Assistant AG Offers Perspective
66.
on Unitary Executive Theory, NPR (May 8, 2019), https://www.npr.org/20
19/05/08/721552525/former-assistant-ag-offers-perspective-on-unitary-executive-theory
[https://perma.cc/92JU-X3CT] (archived Jan. 21, 2021) [hereinafter Assistant AG
Perspective] ("[T]he Constitution... grants him a reservoir of executive power...that
allows him to act as leader of the executive branch to enforce the laws and to defend the
country in times of crisis and emergency."); see also Recent Emergency Legislation, supra
note 57, at 1718-21. (explaining how power is separated, or not separated, in the
executive branch).
For example, consider the Joint Committee in Germany. See infra Part IV.
67.
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doctrine makes sense. The state possesses the power to rule, so it can
also change the rules in an emergency. But, as discussed in Part III,
liberal democracies are skeptical of broad notions of national securityincluding the power of necessity-as those justifications come at the
price of individual rights.

Nevertheless, there is a general consensus today that national
governments are empowered to respond to emergencies. Rather than
stripping the necessity power, liberal democracies focus on who
exercises emergency power within government, where that power

stems from, and how exercises of that power can be reviewed. These
concerns lead liberal democracies to constrain emergency power
through law and structure. This Part analyzes the emergency power
laws and structures across the globe.

A.

Defining the Actor Responsible for Leading Emergency
Responses

While consensus exists among liberal democracies that power
should not be consolidated in one person, experts debate how to
effectively separate power within government during an emergency.

This subpart highlights proposals for separating power in emergencies
before discussing the current separation of powers across the globe.
First, the entity declaring the emergency can be separated from

the entity creating regulations. 68 For instance, the legislative branch
would be the only entity permitted to declare a state of emergency.
Once the legislature declared a state of emergency, the executive would
take the lead to create the regulations that remedy the emergency
situation. This would help reduce perverse incentives for the declaring
body to declare an emergency to increase its own power. 6 9 However,
this solution requires multi-member consensus in the declaration
phase, which potentially prevents the country from acting swiftly in

urgent situations. 7 0 So while this approach protects against abuses of
power, it may fail to effectively protect the nation.

Second, the legislature can promulgate specific standards for
emergency declarations in advance and require legislative approval for

See BOCKENFORDE, supra note 1, at 125-31 (proposing possible solutions to
68.
the emergency power problem). To pass constitutional muster in the United States, this
type of protection would need to ensure it does not purport to take away any inherent
emergency power incident to commander-in-chief and chief executive power. See infra
Part IV.
See BOCKENFORDE, supra note 1, at 128-29 (describing the benefits of an
69.
emergency system that separates the declaration from exercises of power pursuant to

the declaration). It is worth noting that, by this same logic, if the legislature is dominated
by one party, the risk of abuse increases but the risk of delay decreases.
See id. (describing the challenges associated with an emergency system that
70.
separates the declaration from exercises of power pursuant to the declaration).
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any declarations outside that scope. 7 1 For example, the legislature
could stipulate that the executive may only declare a state of
emergency when a threat of an armed attack within the next seventytwo hours exists. The president would be empowered to unilaterally
declare an emergency pursuant to that law if responding to such a
threat but would need to seek approval to declare an emergency under
any other circumstance. This limitation would provide the executive
with some flexibility, particularly in imminent situations, to ensure
swiftness. At the same time, it protects against abuses by requiring
some multi-member consensus when the normal rule of law may be

suspended.
Third, the legislature can promulgate specific proportionality
requirements for the use of power during emergencies. 72 This approach
provides broad power to the executive to determine when a state of
emergency is declared, but reduces the power vested by such
declaration. 73 The legislature could scale the powers unlocked by such
a declaration based on the severity or imminence of the threat. 74 For

example, the legislature could permit the president to declare a state
of emergency when he determines necessary, but limit the use of
military force in the absence of physical invasion.
This approach helps reduce the incentive to declare an unjustified

emergency to expand powers in unrelated areas. 7 5 However, the
structure may incentivize the executive to declare the most "severe"

type of emergency, regardless of the situation's actual severity, to
unlock substantial power. To reduce this incentive, the legislature
would need to promulgate specific requirements for each type of
declaration. 76 Unfortunately, this solution requires the legislative
branch to legislate with specificity, which is challenging to do in
advance and with limited information.

See id. at 131 (differentiating between major and minor states of emergency).
71.
Germany provides an example of this. Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law], art. 115a,
[https://
translation at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch-gg/index.html
perma.cc/V5HJ-2ERY] (archived Sept. 4, 2020).
See ANNA KHAKEE, SECURING DEMOCRACY? A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF
72.
EMERGENCY POWER IN EUROPE 7, 17, 27 (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of

Armed Forces ed.) (2009) (discussing the use of a proportionality requirement).
73.
See id. at 27 (describing how a proportionality requirement operates in a
system with a broad definition of emergency).
74.
For similar analysis, see BOCKENFORDE, supra note 1, at 131 (discussing
major and minor emergencies).
See id. at 112-14 (discussing the perverse incentives of emergency law).
75.
76.

For an example of how specific requirements can reduce these concerns, see

Eur. Consult. Ass., State of Emergency: ProportionalityIssues Concerning Derogations
Under Article 15 of the EuropeanConvention on Human Rights, Doc. No. 14506 (Feb. 27,
2019).
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Countries have adopted different versions of these safeguards,
described in the table below:
Table 1
Country
US

Emergency
Actor
President

Basis of Power
The president's authority is conferred
implicitly through the constitution and
77
Most
explicitly through legislation.
emergency declarations are pursuant to

legislation. 7 8 The legislature must use
traditional lawmaking mechanisms to
overturn national emergency declarations

made pursuant to legislation. 79

The

legislature has little to no review power

over emergency declarations pursuant to
but
such
power,
constitutional
UK

Crown
Prime
Minister

declarations are rare. 80
The crown's authority is conferred
unwritten
the
through
implicitly
constitution, of which there is little
review. 81 The prime minister's authority
through
conferred
explicitly
is
82
an
can
annul
Parliament
legislation.
83
emergency regulation via resolution.

77.
See U.S. Const. art. II, § 1 ("The executive Power shall be vested in a President
of the United States of America."); id. art. II, § 2 ("The President shall be Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States,
when called into the actual Service of the United States."); National Emergencies Act,
50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651 (2018) (creating procedural requirements for national emergency
declarations and granting access to dormant emergency power).
See Kendall Heath, Here's a List of the 31 National Emergencies That Have
78.
Been in Effect for Years, ABC NEWS (Jan. 10, 2019), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/list3
[https://perma.cc/XUS8-Z23E]
31-national-emergencies-effect-years/story?id=6029469
(archived Dec. 30, 2020) (documenting long-lasting national emergencies); see also
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585, 636-37 (1952) (holding that
the president's constitutional powers are weakest when in opposition to Congress).
See Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)
79.
(holding that one house of Congress may not override a presidential veto alone).
The main check Congress has is impeachment, perhaps abuse of power. See
80.
H.R.755, 116th Cong. (2019) (resolving to impeach President Trump for abuse of power).
81.
See BOCKENFORDE, supra note 1, at 121-23 (describing the royal prerogative).
Civil Contingencies Act, 2004 c. 36, §§ 19-28 (Eng.).
82.
83.
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE,
PARLIAMENTARY ScRUTINY OF THE GOVERNMENT'S HANDLING OF COVID-19, 2019-21, HC

https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5801/cmselect/cmpubadm/377/
277
(UK)
37705.htm [https://perma.cc/J4UB-NVDT] (archived Dec. 30, 2020) [hereinafter
PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY].
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France

President

The president's authority is conferred by
the constitution and legislation. 84 The
president must consult with the prime
minister, presidents of the assemblies,
and
the
Constitutional
Council;
Parliament determines the length of
emergencies. 85 In extreme emergencies,

the president has vast, unilateral power
Israel

Prime
Minister

to respond. 8 6
The
prime minister's authority
is
conferred by statute. 8 7 The legislature

must approve of emergency declarations
New
Zealand

Prime
Minister

within seven days. 8 8
The prime minister's authority to declare
an emergency is conferred by statute. 8 9
Some emergency power is implied
through an unwritten constitution. 90 For

certain types of emergencies, the House of
Representatives
may
revoke
an
91

Germany

Legislature

emergency declaration.
The legislative bodies'

Joint

conferred by the constitution. 9 2 The Joint
Committee's authority is also conferred

Committee

authority

is

by the constitution when the legislative
bodies are unable to meet. 93

84.
1958 CONST. arts. 16, 36 (Fr.); Loi 55-385 du 3 avril 1955 relative A l'6tat
d'urgence [Law 55-385 of April 3, 1955 instituting a state of emergency and declaring its
application

in Algeria],

JOURNAL OFFIcIEL DE LA RNPUBLIQUE

FRANQAISE

[J.O.]

[OFFIcIAL GAZETTE OF FRANcE], Dec. 1, 2018; see also KHAKEE, supra note 72, at 22
(explaining that the exceptional presidential powers are wide-ranging and little
regulated but are specifically codified in Article 16 of the Constitution).
85.
See KHAKEE, supra note 72, at 22-24 (describing the French emergency power
system).
Id. at 23-24.
86.
87.
Declaring a State of Emergency, KNESSET, https://knesset.gov.illexicon/
eng/DeclaringStateEmergencyeng.htm [https://perma.ccIW84K-7DYY (archived Sept.
6, 2020) [hereinafter Knesset Declaring].
88.
Id. For more analysis about states of emergency in Israel, see Adam Mizock,
The Legality of the Fifty-Two Year State of Emergency in Israel, 7 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L.
& POLY 223, 238 (2001).
89.
Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 (N.Z).
90.
Matthew J McKillop, Emergency Powers of the New Zealand Government 3942 (Oct. 2010) (LLB Dissertation, University of Otago).
Id. at 20-21.
91.
Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law], art. 115a.
92.
Id. art. 115e.
93.
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Systems in which the President Controls Most Emergency Power
In the United States and France, the constitution divides power

between entities in government. The United States operates under a
separation of power with three coequal branches of government-the
executive, legislative, and judicial branches-which have some
overlapping powers. 94 France's government is interconnected, with the

legislature and president sharing power. 9 5 The United States and
France are very different from countries with parliamentary
supremacy, especially in the context of emergency power.

Both the United States and France empower the president to act
in times of emergency. 96 This structure allows for swift action. In fact,

the French structure of interconnected governance was largely created
to avoid "chronic governmental instability" of purely parliamentary

systems. 97 The risks associated with swiftness during emergencies are
supposedly mitigated by the separation of powers; the power belongs
to the legislature and is exercised by the president after delegation. By
separating the power and involving more entities, raw political will is

checked. While this separation theoretically protects against abuse
better than systems with consolidated power, such as one where the
legislature controls and executes, it also creates a perverse incentive.
When the president ascribes to a different political party than the
legislature or parliament, they may be incentivized to declare an
98
emergency to avoid the legislative process under the guise of legality.
President Trump's emergency declaration at the southern border is an
example of this problem, although his political party even dominated
government at that time. 99 The risk is especially challenging when the
legislature lacks sufficient opposition power to overturn an emergency
declaration.100 The notion that separation of power is a sufficient check

on a large delegations of emergency power is challenged by this

94.
See generally Separation of Powers, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/separation-of-powers_0 (last visited Dec. 31, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/X8EX-LYS3] (archived Dec. 31, 2020) (describing the separation of
powers in the United States).
Nicolas Boring, National Parliaments:France, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (Jan.
95.
2016) https://www.loc.gov/law/help/national-parliaments/france.php [https://perma.cc/
ULA2-92PN] (archived Dec. 31, 2020).
For information about the United States, see Elizabeth Goitein, The Alarming
96.
(Jan./Feb. 2019)
Scope of the President's Emergency Powers, ATLANTIC
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/01/presidential-emergency-powers/
576418/ [https://perma.cc/3PMZ-W5M5] (archived Dec. 31, 2020) (describing the
president's emergency power in the United States). For information about France, see
KHAKEE, supranote 72, at 22-24 (describing the emergency power structure in France).
97.
Boring, supra note 95.
98 . Infra Part II.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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perverse incentive to unnecessarily utilize emergency power, especially

in times of divided government.
2.

Minister Control: Systems Empowering Ministers to Respond to
Emergencies

The United Kingdom and New Zealand are systems of
parliamentary supremacy. 10 1 In systems of parliamentary supremacy,
power is consolidated; parliament grants power to the prime minister,
and the prime minister is answerable to parliament. 10 2 Both the
United Kingdom and New Zealand empower their prime ministers and
103
cabinets to respond to emergencies.
Proponents of parliamentary supremacy argue that it is the
Constituents of
system most subject to democratic control.
parliamentary supremacy systems know exactly who to hold
accountable when unhappy: the majority party. Unified government
makes it easier for swift action and makes accountability more
practicable.
This contrasts with countries that have separation of power. For
example, separation of power means the majority party of the
legislature can often be of a different party than the president's party.
And even if one party controls both the legislature and presidency in
the United States, it is still constrained by certain principles enforced
by the Supreme Court due to constitutional supremacy. This structure
makes it challenging to pin down responsibility and vote out the
responsible party.
But the parliamentary system and its attribute of robust

democratic accountability is not foolproof. Democratic accountabilityin systems of parliamentary supremacy-is much weaker during
national emergencies than in normal moments. While citizens may be
able to identify the individuals responsible for exercises of emergency
power-the majority party-there are less institutional protections for
them. For example, if a prime minister, empowered by the parliament,

acts against the country's best interest, parliament is less likely to call
out the prime minister because he represents the parliament's own

party. While this is also true in systems of constitutional supremacy
when government is united, it is a guaranteed risk in systems of
parliamentary supremacy.

101. McKillop, supranote 90, at 39-42.
102. See Boring, supra note 95 (explaining the operation of parliamentary
systems).
103.

For the United Kingdom, see PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY, supra note 83. For

New Zealand, see Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002, pt. 3 (N.Z) and
McKillop, supra note 90, at 3-16.
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Legislature Control: Systems that Require Legislative Action in
Times of Emergency

Germany's system is unique. The current German Constitution,
10 4
It
the Basic Laws, sets out procedures for emergency declarations.
permits the legislative bodies to declare a state of emergency when the
country is "under attack by armed force or imminently threatened with
such attack." 1 0 5 The Constitution differentiates between permission

for actions taken against an actual attack and those taken to prevent
an imminent threat of attack. If Germany is under attack by armed
forces and the legislative bodies are unable to meet, a state of
emergency is presumed.1 0 6 When a state of emergency is presumedmeaning the state is under attack and the legislative bodies are unable

to convene-the exercise of emergency power without legislative
authorization is permissible.1 07 But when facing an imminent threat,
a state of emergency is not presumed and emergency action is
10 8
Unlike during
impermissible absent legislative authorization.

active attacks, the legislative bodies must first declare a state of
10 9
Action taken during an
emergency before action may be taken.

imminent threat that is not authorized by the legislative bodies is
presumptively illegal.110

The German Constitution seeks to separate power by requiring
parliamentary approval for most emergency action taken by the
chancellor.111 However, the legislative bodies select the chancellor, so
2
the separation alone may not be an effective check on power.11 To

remedy this weakness, the Constitution requires a two-thirds majority

vote to approve of emergency action, which generally necessitates that
some political opponents support the declaration for it to be
approved.

1 13

For imminent threats of attack, the German Constitution provides
a safeguard for declaring a national emergency if the legislative bodies

104. Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law], art. 115a.
105. Id. art. 115a(1).
106. Id. art. 115a(1)-(2), (4).
107. See id.; see also Recent Emergency Legislation, supra note 57, at 1720.
108. See Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law], art. 115a.
109. Id. art. 115a(1), (4).
110. Recent Emergency Legislation, supra note 57, at 1720.
111. Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law], art. 115a; see also Recent Emergency
Legislation, supra note 57, at 1720 (discussing the balancing of values in requiring
consensus).

112. See Recent Emergency Legislation, supra note 57, at 1720-21 ("[T]he danger
that a truly revolutionary party will be so well represented seems less serious than the
danger that the executive will misuse the civil unrest powers with the consent of its
parliamentary majority.").

113. Id. at 1717-18 (describing that support from political opponents requires
debate and discussion within the legislature, precluding decisions made from
information outside of the legislature).
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are unable to convene. 1 14 The Constitution empowers a Joint
Committee to make an emergency declaration in that instance. 11 5 The
Joint Committee has a total of forty-eight representatives, composed of

members from both legislative bodies that are not also members of the
federal government. 1 16 The relative strength of parliamentary groups

is the basis for selecting committee members. 11 7 The Joint Committee
operates as a safeguard for responding to emergencies, serving as a
functional parliament in the face of emergency. 1 18 It balances the need
for swift action with the avoidance of unilateral exercises of power,
while also prioritizing reasoned decision-making. 1 19 The Joint
Committee is capable of swift action because it is relatively small in
12 0
size-it may quickly convene and reach consensus when necessary.
Moreover, the Joint Committee serves as a barrier to unilateral
exercises of power because it is separate from the federal government,
which is the entity that the committee authorizes to exercise
emergency power. 1 21 Accordingly, the Joint Committee reduces
perverse incentives to unnecessarily declare an emergency to increase
one's own power and encourages reasoned decision-making.

B. Codification
Experts disagree on whether emergency powers should be
codified-written into law. Some scholars believe that emergency
powers should not be codified due to the inherent uncertainty
surrounding emergencies. 12 2 Attempting to legislate emergency

powers could be futile as any law is likely to be both under and over
inclusive. 12 3 First, predicting exactly what powers will be necessary in

114. See id. (explaining the rationale for an alternative mechanism, "especially the
defense emergency-which release extensive special powers and therefore require
effective procedural checks may disable the approval mechanism either by preventing it
from functioning or by making necessary rapid action beyond the capabilities of a
representative body.").
115. Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law], art. 115e.
116. Id. art. 53a; see also Role of the Bundesrat in a State of Emergency,
BUNDESRAT,

https://www.bundesrat.de/EN/national-en/ga-en/ga-en-node.html

[https://

perma.cc/3VXC-8JEA] (archived Sept. 5, 2020) ("'The Joint Committee is made up of 32
Bundestag members and 16 Bundesrat members.").

117.
118.
119.

Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law], art. 53(a)(1).
See Recent Emergency Legislation, supranote 57, at 1728-32.
See id. at 1730-31 ("Because the Joint Committee only indirectly represents

varied constituent interests and because its smaller size permits more rapid compromise,

it seems a logical cure for this dilemma.").
120. Id.
121. See id. at 1731-32 ("The decision not to vest the legislative power in the
executive if neither the normal parliament nor the Joint Committee can function seems

advisable.").
122. See FATOVIC, supra note 2, at 262-63 (listing three major problems with
emergency legislation).
123. Id. at 263.
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emergencies is challenging, if not impossible.1 24 Therefore, laws
written for emergencies are bound to be inadequate. Second,
committing authorizations of emergency power to text may increase

the likelihood that officials will unnecessarily invoke the power. As one
scholar wrote, the concern surrounding codification is that emergency
power declarations may "achieve a degree of legitimacy merely by
virtue of their legality."1

25

Additionally, opponents of codification

generally ascribe to the notion that the government has some inherent
power to respond to emergencies. 1 2 6 This means that, when a
government acts pursuant to inherent emergency powers, it does so at
the risk that such an act may be illegal. This risk should incentivize
the government to only use emergency powers when absolutely
necessary. 12 7

In contrast, some scholars zealously advocate for codification of
emergency powers through detailed statutes. Such scholars believe
that codification is critical to constraining emergency powers because
it leads to transparency and oversight.1 2 8 Acknowledging the elephant
in the room by explicitly writing emergency powers into law forces
authentic discussion over when and how emergency powers should be

used.1 2 9 In turn, safeguards and substantive limits can be written into
the law as well to prevent abuses of the power. 13 0 For example, legally
requiring the government to declare a state of emergency before
exercising exceptional powers helps notify the public that the
emergency state is abnormal. 1 31 It puts the citizenry on notice that
they should expect, and demand, that the government resume the
normal state of affairs promptly. Without a formal declaration of

124. For example, the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 were committed by
nonstate, foreign actors, leading to a unique and unprecedented response. For further
analysis see BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK: PRESERvING CIvIL LIBERTIES
IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 13-38 (2007).

125. FATOvIC, supra note 2, at 263.
126. See id. at 255-64 (explaining the government prerogative to respond to
emergencies).
127. The idea is that the emergency actor will exercise caution in responding to an
emergency because he cannot absolve himself of responsibility by leaning on written law.
Germany faced an issue like this with the Aviation Security Act, which authorized the
government to shoot down a hijacked plane. The Supreme Court struck down this law,

despite acknowledging that shooting down a hijacked plane might be legally permissible
in rare circumstances. See generally Tatjana Hornle, Shooting Down a Hijacked PlaneThe German Discussion and Beyond, 3 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 111 (2009).
128. See BOCKENFORDE, supra note 1, at 111-15 (describing the risks of a
supralegal emergency power structure).
129. See id. at 118 (" [I]f the state of emergency is to be circumscribed and
controlled by the law, this cannot be accomplished through a refusal, that is, by the
assertion that the state of emergency does not occur legally, but only through the
availability of powers and modalities that are related to this situation and are fitted to
it.").
130. See id. at 119-21 (discussing the "specific nature" of emergency regulations).
131. Id. at 119.
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emergency, citizens may not be aware that the country is operating
under the altered legal scheme until the government has already
committed egregious infringements on individual rights.

On both sides of the debate over codification, the goal is to prevent
the normalization of emergency powers. 13 2 The key disagreement
centers on whether committing authorizations of emergency power to

text increases the likelihood that officials will unnecessarily invoke the
power. Both sides agree that the public only consents to the use of
emergency powers during discrete, exceptional times. Therefore, the
best system is one that encourages the government to think critically
before employing exceptional powers so that they are only used in the
circumstances under which the public would consent.
As discussed above, Germany has strict rules on emergency
declarations that are codified in the Constitution. 13 3 But this was not
always the case. Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution governed
emergency powers during World War II and was extremely susceptible

to abuse. 1 34 The president was permitted to unilaterally declare an
emergency, and emergency declarations functionally provided the
chancellor with full legislative powers. 13 5 While part of parliament
was permitted to object to emergency declarations, the president could
13 6
retaliate to such objections and order reelection of the parliament.
Hitler, serving as chancellor, used emergency power authorizations to
gain substantial power before and during World War 11.137 Germany's
current constitution was written against this backdrop and therefore

132. See id. at 118 ("[I]t should revert as quickly as possible to the normal state of
affairs."); see also FATOVIC, supra note 2, at 263 ("[A]n extra-legal approach might be less
likely to have long-lasting deleterious effects on political institutes.").
133. Infra Part III.C.
134. See KHAKEE, supra note 72, at 20 (describing how Article 48 made is very easy
to establish a state of emergency and restrict basic rights); HANS MoMMSEN, THE RISE
AND FALL OF WEIMAR DEMOCRACY 57 (Elborg Forster & Larry Eugene Jones trans.,

1996) ( "[A]lthough the chancellor retained ultimate political responsibility by virtue of
his right to countersign any presidential decree, the mistaken perception could very
easily arise that in a state of crisis such powers rested solely with the president...this
provision encouraged the notion that there was no harm in relying on presidential
authority whenever the parties themselves were incapable of reaching a compromise on
important governmental matters.").
135. See David Dyzenhaus, Legal Theory in the Collapse of Weimar: Contemporary
Lessons?, 91 AM. POL. SC. REV. 121, 122-23 (describing the president's vast powers
under the Weimar Constitution); MOMMSEN, supranote 134, at 57 (describing the power
of the president and chancellor); see also Jeffrey Herf, Perspective, Emergency Powers
Helped Hitler's Rise. Germany Has Avoided Them Ever Since, WASH. POST. (Feb. 19,
2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/02/19/emergency-powers-helpedhitlers-rise-germany-has-avoided-them-ever-since/ [https://perma.cc/Q643-C2C3] (archived Jan. 9, 2021) (explaining how Germany's vast emergency power contributed to
Hitler's rise).
136. See Dyzenhaus, supra note 135, at 122-23 (describing how the Weimar
Constitution's safeguards were insufficient).
137. Id.; KHAKEE, supra note 72, at 20.
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includes many explicit safeguards.1 38 This concern is shared in other
post-World War II constitutions, which robustly codify procedures and
protections.
The chart below discusses the degree to which countries codify
emergency powers:

Table 2
Country
US

Deree of Codification
The US Constitution does not speak specifically to
emergency power.1 3 9 The president is understood to

have some implied emergency power under the
constitution incident to his powers as Commander-in-

Chief and Chief Executive.1 4 0
The US president has expansive emergency powers
under statute. 1 41 The statute lacks a definition for
national emergency. 14 2 Under the emergency power

statute, an emergency declaration unlocks many other
UK

1 43
statutory emergency powers otherwise dormant.
There is no written constitution in the UK, but the

crown has implied emergency powers under the notion
of an unwritten constitution. 144
The prime minister's emergency power is codified by
le gslation.1 4 5

138. See KHAKEE, supra note 72, at 20-21 (comparing the safeguards in Germany
to those in other countries, explaining that Germany's safeguards today are stronger
than most).
139. L. ELAINE HALCHIN,
EMERGENCY POWERS 1-3 (2020).

CONG.

RsCH.

SERV.,

REP. #

98-505, NATIONAL

140. Id. For further information about implied emergency power in the United
States, see Albert L. Sturm, Emergencies and the Presidency, 11 J. POL., 121, 125-126
(1949).
141. National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651 (1976).
142. Id.
143.

HALCHIN, REP. # 98-505, NATIONAL EMERGENCY POWERS at 8-11.

144. See BOCKENFORDE, supra note 1, at 121-23 (explaining the role of the royal
prerogative in Great Britain).
145. Civil Contingencies Act, 2004, c. 36, §§ 19-28 (Eng.).
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expansive
provides
French
Constitution
The
emergency powers to the president.1 4 6 While most of
the president's power is shared with the prime
minister, the emergency power is unique and held
almost exclusively by the president. 1 47

France

French legislation codifies the president's emergency
148
powers in states of siege.
In Israel, the prime minister's emergency power is

Israel

codified by legislation. 149
New Zealand

Germany

The New Zealand prime minister has a narrow implied
power through an unwritten constitution to respond to
emergencies. 15 0 Statute codifies and expands the
prime minister's emergency power. 15 1
The German Constitution codifies the legislature's
emergency powers. 152 Unlike other countries, this

power is not delegated out by the constitution or
statute but instead requires legislative consensus. 1 53

C. Availability of JudicialReview for Emergency Action
Systems of parliamentary sovereignty prioritize political
accountability over legal accountability-there are few, if any, legal
rights protected outside of the legislative action. 15 4 In contrast,

systems of constitutional sovereignty emphasize legal accountability
over political accountability-there are domains with which the
political

146.

branches

may

not

interfere.1 5 5

While

constitutional

1958 CONST. arts. 16, 36 (Fr.); CINDY SKACH, BORROWING CONSTITUTIONAL

DESIGNS 98-99 (2005).
147.

SKACH, supra note 146, at 98-99.

148. Loi 55-385 du 3 avril 1955 relative a 1'6tat d'urgence [Law 55-385 of April 3,
1955 instituting a state of emergency and declaring its application in Algeria], JOURNAL
OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANQAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Dec. 1,
2018.
149. Knesset Declaring, supra note 87.
150. Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 (N.Z); McKillop, supra note
90.
151. Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 (N.Z).
152. Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law], art. 115a.
153. Id.
154.

Lord

Irvine

of

Lairg,

Sovereignty

in

Comparative

Perspective:

Constitutionalism in Britain and America, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3-5, 7 (2001)
[Hereinafter Lairg].
155. Id. at 5-7 ("Constitutional supremacy and parliamentary sovereignty are
often perceived as concepts which are polemically op- posed to one another, given that
the former limits legislative power and entrenches fundamental rights, while the latter
embraces formally unlimited power and eschews the entrenchment of human rights.").
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supremacy purports to more robustly protect individuals, the
protection depends on decisions of unelected judges. As the judiciary
15 6
changes over time, so do the protections for individuals.
15 7
For
The United States is a system of constitutional supremacy.

many reasons, the legislature often punts difficult questions to the
judiciary. Rather than legislating protections for marginalized groups
or legislating with specificity, the legislature may wait for a

controversy to arise, pushing the question to the federal judiciary and,
15 8
potentially, the Supreme Court.
Countries with parliamentary supremacy have substantially less
1 59
The
judicial review of legislative acts than in the United States.
parliament, seen as supreme, largely controls emergency power, either
to be exercised by a prime minister-answerable to the parliament0
or an executive, like a president. 16 Litigants may challenge the

legitimacy of a government action under a statute, perhaps
action is not permitted under the statute, but not the statute
Traditionally, the only protection against legislative acts
allegation of ultra vires power-that an act was outside the

that the
itself. 16 1
was the
power of

the government, perhaps to entrench the government's own power; this

type of claim is only successful in "gross usurpation[s] of power" or an

156 . Id. at 7-8 ( "[I]t follows that, while constitutional supremacy is a fixed feature
of the U.S. Constitution, the concept is a flexible one, the precise meaning of which is,
ultimately, a product of contemporary legal and political thought."); see also Adam
Cohen, Supreme Inequality: The Supreme Court's Fifty-Year Battle for a More Unjust
America (2020) (discussing how the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court has changed, on
a large scale, as individual justices have retired, died, or otherwise left the bench).
157. U.S. Const. art. VI, para. 2 ("This Constitution, and the laws of the United
States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land;
and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or
laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.").
158. This norm is not unique to any one area of law. For example, see Obergefell
v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (holding that the right to marry extends to same-sex
couples) and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that it is a woman's right to
terminate a pregnancy).
159. See Lairg, supra note 154, at 15-21 (discussing the history of judicial review
in the UK, as well as the current role of judicial review in systems of parliamentary
supremacy).

160. See id. at 15-16 ("The courts therefore approach all legislation on the wellfounded presumption that Parliament intends to legislate consistently with such
principles.").
161. Id. at 15-17.
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allegation of procedural defect. 16 2 In those instances, a court would

impose fundamental legal values on a legislature. 16 3
While litigants in the United States have more routes to challenge
legislative acts, the existence of such review does not necessarily better
protect against abuse. 164 The systems of parliamentary supremacy, in
contrast, may actually better protect citizens by encouraging the
legislature to build safeguards into law. Unlike in the United States,
where tough decisions may be punted to the judiciary, courts in
systems of parliamentary supremacy have far less power; systems of
parliamentary sovereignty have a much weaker backstop. 16 5 Perhaps
this leads to more democratic accountability, incentivizing officials to
implement safeguards into legislation so that they are not voted out.
This analysis suggests that the United States should not assume
that judicial review sufficiently protects against abuse, at least
compared to systems of parliamentary sovereignty. Instead, the United

States should be cognizant that all rights are subject to interpretation
by unelected individuals, so safeguards ought to be placed into
legislation from the get-go, especially in the realm of emergency
powers. The incentive for the legislature to do this in the United States
should be stronger than in systems with parliamentary supremacy.
Parliament elects the prime minister, so building in safeguards means

cutting against one's own power. In contrast, the US legislature
building in safeguards would protect its own power from being cut into
by the executive or judiciary.

162. See Rivka Weill, Reconciling ParliamentarySovereignty and JudicialReview:
On the Theoretical and Historical Origins of the Israeli Legislative Override Power, 39
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 457, 482, 505 (deriving norms of judicial review in systems of
parliamentary supremacy for application in Israel).
163. See id. at 505 ("Under this approach, the use of judicial review would not be
perceived as counter-majoritarian. All these methods represent a 'soft' form of
constitutionalism that conforms to parliamentary sovereignty.").
164. U.S. Const. art. VI, para. 2; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)
(establishing judicial review of laws, statutes, and government actions under the
constitution).
165. Veit Bader, Parliamentary Supremacy versus Judicial Supremacy, 12
UTRECHT L. REV. 159, 163-64 (discussing the advantages of judicial review).
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The chart below discusses how different countries approach the role of
judicial review in the emergency power structure:

Table 3
Count

US

Role of Judicial Review
Judicial review is broadly available for legislative acts,
executive actions pursuant to legislative acts, and
executive

actions pursuant to the constitution. 166

Courts may strike down legislative acts and executive
actions. 167

UK

Judicial review is available for actions taken by the
prime minister pursuant to legislation. 16 8 Judicial

review may be available for actions taken by the Crown
pursuant to implied constitutional power, but courts
are likely highly deferential. 1 6 9 Judicial review is not

available for legislation.1 7 0
France

Judicial review of legislation, before promulgation, is

available to members of parliament.171 Judicial review
of legislation and executive action is available to
private litigants after implementation.1

Israel
New
Zealand
Germany

72

Judicial review is available for executive acts and, to
73
some degree, legislation.1
Judicial review is available for executive acts but
foreclosed for legislation.1 74
Judicial review is broadly available for any violations
17 5
of fundamental rights by public authorities.

166. U.S. Const. art. VI, para. 2.
167. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
168. See Lairg, supra note 154, at 15-18 (discussing how the judiciary protects
fundamental norms).
169. Id.
170. See BOCKENFORDE, supra note 1, at 121-23 (discussing emergency power in
the UK). Technically, judicial review for violations of treaties is available but courts lack
power to do much. See Lairg, supra note 154, at 18-19 (discussing how the Human Rights
Act of 1988 constrains government action).
171. See Boring, supra note 95 ("[T]he President of the Republic, the Prime
Minister, the President of either chamber of Parliament, or a group of sixty deputies or
sixty senators, may ask the Conseil constitutionnel to review a bill's constitutionality
before promulgation.").
172. See id. (discussing the QPC procedure).
173. See Weill, supra note 162, at 463, 504-05 (discussing the overlap of
parliamentary supremacy and constitutionalism in Israel).
174. See McKillop, supranote 90, at 22-33 (describing the types of review available
in New Zealand).
175. See generally Georg Nolte & Peter Radler, Judicial Review in Germany, 1
EUR. PUB. L. 26 (1995).
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D. Summary of Safeguards

The prior three subparts discuss how emergency powers differ in
application from state to state. While some practical differences are
substantial, the structural underpinnings-broad categories such as
codification and notice requirements-are actually common across
many countries. The fact that many countries utilize the same

safeguards exemplifies that the mere existence of a safeguard is not
enough to prevent misuse of emergency powers. Instead, safeguards
should be designed to be effective both in theory and in practice.
The chart below

provides

a broad

summary of the structural

safeguards used in different countries:
Table 4
Country
US1 76

Summary of Safeguards
.
*
*

-

UK1

77

"
.
*
"
*
*
*

Legislative codification
Requires congressional notification
Requires annual renewal

Congressional termination of emergency by
joint resolution (subject to presidential veto)
Judicial review
Legislative codification
Requires parliamentary notification
Requires parliamentary approval within
seven days
Regulations expire after thirty days, but new
regulations may be promulgated
Requires necessity, proportionality, and
seriousness to be considered
Some judicial review

176. National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651 (2018); see also L. ELAINE
HALCHIN, CONG. RSCH. SERv., REP. # 98-505, NATIONAL EMERGENCY POWERS 1, 8-21

(2020) (discussing the history and modern use of the National Emergencies Act).
177. Civil Contingencies Act 2004, c. 36, §§ 19-28 (Eng.); see also PARLIAMENTARY
SCRUTINY, supra note 83.
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*

Legislative codification
Requires consultation with prime minister,

*
*
*

presidents of both houses of parliament, and
the Constitutional Council
Parliament determines length of emergency
Requires notification to nation
Distinct levels of emergency

*

Judicial Review

*

Legislative codification
Legislature must declare emergency

*
*
*

Emergency declarations limited to one year,
but new regulations may be promulgated
Proportionality requirement

*

Some judicial review

New

*

Legislative codification

Zealand 180

*

Notification to House of Representative
required
Requirement that Parliament convene

*

*

Necessity and expediency requirement
Substantial constitutional codification
Legislature must declare emergency

*

Joint Committee to declare emergency if

*
Germany 18 1

*

legislature cannot meet; limits on Joint

*

Committee power
Joint Committee advises Chancellor on
emergency planning during peacetime

*
*

Distinct levels of emergency
Judicial Review

178. 1958 CoNST. arts. 16, 36 (Fr.); Loi 55-385 du 3 avril 1955 relative a l'6tat
d'urgence [Law 55-385 of April 3, 1955 instituting a state of emergency and declaring its
application in Algeria], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RtEPUBLIQUE FRANQAISE [J.O.]
[OFFIcIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Dec. 1, 2018; KHAKEE, supra note 72, at 22 (discussing

French emergency powers); Boring, supra note 95 (discussing judicial review in France).
179. See Knesset Declaring, supra note 87 (discussing the operation of emergency
powers); Weill, supra note 162, at 463, 504-05 (analyzing the relationship between
parliamentary supremacy and constitutional review in Israel).
180. Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 (N.Z); see also McKillop,
supra note 90, at 22-33 (discussing judicial review in New Zealand).
181. Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law], art. 115a.; see also Nolte & Radler, supra note
175 (discussing judicial review in Germany).
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V. SOLUTION

Countries choose different ways to strike the balance between
respecting individual rights and protecting national security during
national emergencies. Some countries do this better than others, but it
is difficult to directly compare emergency power systems because some

countries have effectively relied on trustworthy leaders. 18 2 When
leaders do not abuse power and effectively govern through consensus,
emergency power structures may appear sufficiently effective at
preventing abuse and protecting the nation. 18 3 But when leaders take
advantage of emergency power systems, monopolizing on the trust of
nation, the need for safeguards becomes more apparent.

The United States is at this juncture now. While past presidents
generally used emergency powers in times of bipartisan consensus, the
risk of abuse is not new-President Trump simply took advantage of
the instability of the emergency power regime.1 84 He used it to
implement his policy initiatives at the border when facing opposition
And when true emergency struck-a highly
in Congress.
communicable virus-the emergency power structure was quite
weak. 1 85 Perhaps a more trustworthy president would have used the
emergency power structure to more effectively respond to the pandemic
and a more involved Congress would have passed prompt legislation.
But that did not happen.
Instead of standing by over the next four years, the United States
should fundamentally alter its emergency power structure. Rather
than entrusting national emergency responses to one person with little

immediate accountability, the United States should develop a system
with robust safeguards, taking notes from other countries across the

globe.
The key features of an effective emergency power regime are: 1)
legislating with specificity to guide decision-making and allow for
robust judicial review, 2) requiring consensus among a multi-member

body

to

encourage

reasoned

decision-making

and

avoid

disproportionate weight to one person's views.

182. See FATOVIc, supra note 2, at 5-8 (discussing the role of a president's
character during emergencies).
183. See infra Part IV. For example, New Zealand has a system with few built-in
safeguards, yet it is not abused.
184. See Liz Hempowicz, BipartisanCoalition Urges Senate Leadership to Allow a
Vote on Emergency Powers Reform, PROJECT ON GOV'T OVERSIGHT (Sept. 24, 2019)

https://www.pogo.org/letter/2019/09/bipartisan-coalition-urges-senate-leadership-to-allo
w-a-vote-on-emergency-powers-reform/ [https://perma.cc/C2VP-M27D] (archived Jan.
15, 2021) (describing the long-standing need for emergency power reform).
185. See infra Part II (discussing the problems with exercises of emergency power).
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A. Legislating with Specificity
An ideal emergency power system includes nuanced, specific
legislation authorizing emergency power. Nuanced, specific legislation

is particularly important for the United States because the emergency
actor is the president-one individual who is not directly answerable
to the legislature. 18 6 The legislature's main role in emergency power is
setting up the system before an emergency because the president has
nearly entire discretion once a statute is passed as law. 18 7 Congress
has consistently failed to place meaningful safeguards on this
discretion in statutes. 1 88 Legislating with specificity is a prime way for

Congress to reassert its proper role in the lawmaking process during
emergencies.

Congress should legislate with specificity in two ways. The first
step is for Congress to define a national emergency. Second, Congress
should impose a proportionality requirement on all exercises of
emergency power. This system greatly contrasts to the statutory

system utilized today, in which the president's power to declare an
emergency is entirely discretionary and such declaration unlocks vast
powers of government.

186. Infra Table 1; U.S. Const. art. II, § 1 ("The executive Power shall be vested in
a President of the United States of America."); id. art. 2, § 2 ("The President shall be
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of
the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States."); National
Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651 (2018) (creating procedural requirements for
national emergency declarations and granting access to dormant emergency power).
187. See Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)
(holding that one house of Congress may not override a presidential veto alone; to
overturn a national emergency, both houses of Congress must pass legislation).
188. See Hempowicz, supra note 184 ("Congress enacted the National Emergencies
Act to bolster its oversight of emergencies and to more closely coordinate with the
executive in emergency situations. But the law has not worked as Congress intended.").
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The proposed statutory text is below:

To exercise emergency powers otherwise authorized by
statute, the president must formally declare a national
emergency. A national emergency is defined as an
unforeseen dangerous situation, requiring urgent
action to prevent abrupt, substantial harm. While
statutory emergency powers are not designed for use in

long-term crises causing incremental damage, the
president may find that a national emergency exists
during specific instances of escalation during long-term
crises to prevent abrupt, substantial harm.
All exercises of emergency power pursuant to this

statute

and any other related statute

must be

proportional in duration, breadth, and intensity to the
emergency situation. Within forty-eight hours of an
emergency declaration, the president must transmit to
Congress a description of the national emergency with
sufficient specificity to demonstrate the necessity and
proportionality of the emergency response.
Legislating with specificity provides two crucial protections. First,
the specific legislation can guide executive decision-making. Congress
may use its resources, such as committee hearings, to create a nuanced
emergency power structure. 1 89 By constraining executive discretion
and providing more specific guiding principles, the legislation would
both empower presidents with tools to make informed decisions during
emergencies and would constrain presidents from using emergency
power in an arbitrary manner. 19 0 Second, the specific legislation would

189.

See

Senate

Committees,

U.S.

SENATE,

https://www.senate.gov/

artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Committees.htm#4 (last visited Jan. 15, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/DU5D-HNKW] (archived Jan. 15, 2021) (discussing the role of
committees as to "develop specialized knowledge of the matters" and "monitor on-going
governmental operations, identify issues suitable for legislative review, gather and
evaluate information, and recommend courses of action.").
190. Congress must legislate with a certain degree of specificity to avoid
nondelegation doctrine concerns, especially with the new makeup of the Supreme Court
that has expressed interest in requiring Congress to legislate with more specificity when
delegating power to the executive branch. See Gundy v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2116,
2148 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (reasoning that "while Congress can enlist considerable
assistance from the executive branch in filling up details and finding facts, it may never
hand off to the nation's chief prosecutor the power to write his own criminal code. That
'is delegation running riot."'); see also Cary Coglianese, Opinion, Six Degrees of
https://www.theregreview.org/
(Dec.
23,
2019),
REV.
Delegation, REGUL.
2019/12/23/coglianese-six-degrees-delegation/ [https://perma.cc/WPK6-GU6M] (archived
Jan. 15, 2021) (describing the "full dimensionality" by which Congress should legislate
to avoid nondelegation concerns, specifically: 1) nature of action, 2) basis for decision-
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provide federal courts with standards by which they can evaluate
emergency declarations and power exercised pursuant to such
declarations. As discussed in Part IV, judicial review in the United
States has the potential to provide robust protection against
presidential abuses of power. More specific legislation would
strengthen both legislative and constitutional review. It would help the
courts determine whether the president is acting in compliance with

the statute-which the court is currently unable to effectively do, given
that the NEA does not define a national emergency.1 9 1 Additionally, it
would help the court determine whether the president is acting in

accord with his constitutional role within the separation of powersthat the president is exercising only executive, and not legislative,

power.1 9 2 The U.S. Supreme Court has long held that a president's
93
power is at its lowest when acting in opposition to Congress.1 Specific
emergency legislation would help the courts determine when the

president is in fact acting in opposition to Congress, rather than with
its implicit approval or acquiescence.

B. Requiring Consensus Among a Multi-Member Body
Emergency power is unique in that it involves the rewriting of
basic law. Unlike laws passed during normal times that change things

like taxes or healthcare, emergency power alters the basic legal
structure of a country. 19 4 Decisions altering the fundamental
governing structure pose difficult questions, largely discussed in Part
III, that one individual-or even one part of government-should not

be entrusted to answer alone.195 Normally,

alterations to the

fundamental governing structure require constitutional amendment or

at least broad consensus across government, but such a requirement

making, 3) extent of required process, 4) degree of sanctions, 5) range of regulated
targets, and 6) scope of regulated activities).
191. Under Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585, 636-37
(1952), the president's power is at its highest when declaring a national emergency since
he is acting with explicit legislative approval (or perhaps under implicit approval from
Congress, operating in a shared-power space, with the court still often deferring to the
president). Id.
192. See Gundy, 139 S.Ct. at 2148 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (reasoning that the
legislature may not delegate legislative power).
193. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 585, 636-37.
194. See FATOVIC, supra note 2, at 5 ("[E]mergencies have the potential to unsettle
temporarily the entire system of institutional and procedural checks and balances.").
195. Liberal scholars have discussed these questions for centuries, recognizing
that "the formal strictures of the rule of law were insufficient to prevent executive power
from mutating into tyranny in times of emergency." Id. at 6. For an analysis of early
liberal scholars and this topic, see id. at 1-10. See also BOCKENFORDE, supra note 1, at
125-28 (discussing how the state of emergency must be differentiated from the state of
emergency to avoid "the integrity of the normal state of affairs slips from its grasp.").

20201

FORTIFYING AMERICAN EMERGENCY POWER

1721

in an emergency would slow down necessary responses, possibly
inhibiting an effective response.
The current US emergency power regime simply requires the

president to determine that a national emergency exists-the NEA
19 6
gives full discretion to the president to make such determination.
This amount of discretion is in opposition to a requirement of

consensus. And even a reduction in the level of delegated discretion by
legislating with specificity, discussed in the subpart above, still vests
the power of authorization solely with the president. The president
would be constrained from acting unless certain determinations were
made, but he alone would be responsible for making those

determinations. 197
To remedy this, Congress should create an independent
commission for emergencies: The Emergency Power Commission.
Germany's system, specifically the Joint Committee, should serve as a
model. The commission would both help the president prepare before
emergencies-creating guidelines for responding to emergencies-and
providing
fact-finding,
undertaking
emergencies-by
during

recommendations, and collaborating with other agencies.
To advise a president before emergencies, the Emergency Power
Commission would promulgate nonbinding guidelines interpreting the
emergency statute from Congress. The president could use these
guidelines to help determine what conditions are required to declare a

national emergency. During these instances, the agency would operate
somewhat like the Office of Legal Counsel, providing opinions that can
1 98
The
guide the president's actions but are not legally binding.

Emergency Power Commission, like the German Joint Committee,
would work with the president to provide expertise and to understand
the president's decision-making processes so that the commission can
9
be most helpful during actual emergencies. 19 Additionally, the

196. National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651 (2018).
197. It is worth noting that specific legislation would create standards for judicial
review, making judicial review a more robust check on the president's discretion. See
infra Part V.A.
198. The OLC "provides legal advice to the President and all executive branch
agencies." Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/olc
(last visited Jan. 15, 2021) [https://perma.cc/E7NW-M4B6] (archived Jan. 15, 2021). The
Emergency Power Commission would possess the most specialized knowledge on
emergency powers but could work with and seek advice from the OLC in generating
guidance and recommendations.
199. See Recent Emergency Legislation, supra note 57, at 1728-30 (discussing
peacetime role of the Joint Committee). A US Congressman has recently introduced
legislation to create an emergency commission, though its focus is on states rather than
the federal government. One notable feature is that the commission would consult both
the president and Congress of responses to national emergencies. See Press Release,
Brian Fitzpatrick, United States Representative, Fitzpatrick Introduces Bipartisan Bill
to Prepare for Future National Emergencies (Apr. 7, 2020), https://fitzpatrick.house.gov/
2020/4/fitzpatrick-introduces-bipartisan-bill-prepare-future-national-emergencies [http
s://perma.cc/A4HR-TS3G] (archived Jan. 21, 2021).
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guidelines could be made public with classified information redacted,
contributing to accountability by providing citizens with a roadmap for
legal exercises of emergency power. With this knowledge, citizens will

be better equipped to identify when exercises of emergency power are
improper, empowering them to push for a return to the normal state of

affairs. 2 00
During a potential emergency situation, the Emergency Power
Commission would assist in fact-finding to help and guide the

president. For example, during the declared emergency at the southern
border, the commission would have documented the factual
underpinnings for such declaration and then advised the president on

whether those conditions constituted a national emergency under the
statute.

The commission would perform any fact-finding that it

determined necessary and helpful, as well as fact-finding at the
direction of the president. The

commission would then issue a

recommendation.
The president would not be formally bound by the agency's
recommendations, though the recommendations would hopefully be
helpful and informative; the president would retain discretion over

whether to declare a national emergency. 2 0 1 But if a national
emergency declaration were to be challenged in court, judges could use
the agency guidelines, factual findings, and recommendations to
inform the court's own interpretation of the statute (and the
declaration's compliance with the statute). A court may grant the
agency some form of Skidmore deference, considering the agency's
expertise and thoroughness of its process. 2 0 2 Promulgating nonbinding
20 3
guidelines is common practice for agencies.

The president could request that the commission evaluate an
emergent situation before he makes an emergency declaration. The
commission would use its guidelines to advise the president on whether

an emergency declaration would be appropriate. Doing this would help
the president's declaration gain legitimacy with the people, as it would
derive from independent consensus and not simply a unilateral,

partisan action by the president to increase his own power.
The Emergency Power Commission would effectively balance the
necessity of swiftness with reasoned decision-making. Unlike if

200. See BOCKENFORDE, supra note 1, at 125-28 (discussing the importance of
separating the state of emergency from the normal state of affairs).
201. See Assistant AG Perspective, supra note 66 (discussing the unitary executive
theory).

202. See generally Skidmore v. Swift, 323 US 134
may give agency interpretations deference based on
thoroughness of considerations, and persuasiveness).
203. See Jennifer L. Selin, What Makes an Agency
SCI. 971, 972-75 (2015) (explaining how the structure
agencies affect both their autonomy from the executive
their autonomy in making policy decisions).

(1944) (reasoning that courts
the reasoning, consistency,
Independent?, 59 AM. J. POL.
and function of independent
and legislative branches and
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Congress were required to agree on a response, the committee will be

smaller and of particular expertise. The committee will also have time
to plan ahead so that it does not have to recreate the wheel for every
emergency situation and can work collaboratively with other agencies
to guide a coordinated government response.
At the same time, the committee does not formally constrain the
president from declaring an emergency during a crisis. If immediate
action is necessary and the committee cannot convene or agree, the
president may still act. But even in those instances, the committee
operates as a safeguard, collecting information and promulgating
recommendations that can be evaluated by a reviewing court.

Therefore, the commission would serve as a safeguard both before
emergency declarations and during emergency declarations.
There is an important distinction between the German system and

the proposed US system. The Joint Committee in Germany is a
functional legislature for emergencies-it is designed to convene when
the legislature is unable to do so. 2 04 While the U.S. Congress could
create a legislative agency to guide itself during emergencies, it may

not create a legislative agency to guide the president. The US
Constitution requires any executive agency to act independently from
Congress. 20 5 To satisfy this constraint and survive constitutional
scrutiny, Congress should provide the agency with its general purposes

and structure and then set the agency free to execute the necessary
2 06
measures during emergencies.
This distinction is important for US constitutional reasons, but
the US agency will still share many similarities with the German
system, as the emergency actor will be the one associated with the
multi-member group. In Germany, the legislature is the one
empowered to respond to emergencies. In the United States, the power
to respond to emergencies has historically been vested in the president.
The German Joint Committee works under and with the emergency
actor, the legislature. The Emergency Power Commission in the United

States would also work with the emergency actor, which is the
president.
Unfortunately, removing Congress from the agency deliberations
means that more power is vested with the executive, which is made up
of one political party. A reasonable compromise is to structure the

Emergency

Power

Commission

as

an

independent

agency.

Independent agencies, while formally a part of the executive branch,

204. See Recent Emergency Legislation, supra note 57, at 1718-20 (discussing how
the Joint Committee operates as a functional parliament during emergencies).

205. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
206. See id. at 734 ("Congress of course initially determined the content of the
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act; and undoubtedly the content of the
Act determines the nature of the executive duty. However, as Chadha makes clear, once
Congress makes its choice in enacting legislation, its participation ends.").
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operate one degree apart from the president. While presidents may
appoint commissioners to independent agencies, removal of
commissioners is generally limited. Additionally, independent
agencies can be designed so that appointments are not dominated by
one political party. 2 0 7

Creating the Emergency Power Commission as an independent
agency would help depoliticize emergency power as a whole. While
Congress would still be unable to directly control the agency, the
agency would be, to some degree, insulated from the president's
political pressure. 20 8

VI. CONCLUSION

Emergency power is an exception to the normal rule of law. It
should be exercised with caution and only in exceptional
circumstances. Countries across the globe grapple with the dilemmas
of emergency power: prioritizing national security while respecting
individual rights and acknowledging the need for swift action while

encouraging

reasoned

decision-making.

Some

countries

have

succeeded at designing emergency power systems that robustly protect
against abuse, some countries have seen their safeguards fail, while

others have effectively relied on trustworthy leaders without the use of
safeguards.
Illustrations

of emergency power

problems

are numerous-

unjustified declarations of emergency, exercises of emergency power in
discriminatory ways, continual extensions of national emergencies,

and ineffective responses to crises. The United States is a prime
example of the risks of emergency power-experiencing both the use of
emergency powers to achieve policy initiatives in the face of substantial

political opposition and the failure to effectively use emergency powers
to curb a crisis. But the United States is not alone in facing these risks;
the problems associated with emergency power persist globally.
This Note analyzed the emergency power structures in various
countries to identify the best systems-ones allowing for swift
responses, respecting individual rights, and encouraging reasoned

decision-making. Taking account of the best features of these systems,
this Note proposes a solution for the United States: nuanced, specific
legislation and a multi-member body to advise the president during

207. For a preview of future debates over independent agencies, see Seila Law v.
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020) (arguably increasing the degree to
which the president must have control of agencies). For an example of appointments not
dominated by one political party, see the Federal Trade Commission.
208. Id. It would be prudent for Congress to consider the rationale in Seila Law
when designing the specifics of the Emergency Power Commission so that the
commission can survive constitutional review.
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national emergencies. While the solution is targeted to the United
States, other countries ought to take note too.
The risks of emergency power will never be fully eliminatedstepping outside of the normal rule of law is risky. But as emergencies
remain inevitable, emergency power must endure. If well designed, an
emergency power system can both safeguard the future of a country
while respecting vital rights belonging to the people-even in the

hands of distrusted leaders.
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